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The causes of the dramatic rise in military spending in the post-war era have been the
subject of much political and academic controversy. No extant formulation seems to provide
a compelling explanation of the dynamics involved in the levels of, and rates of change in,
such spending.
In light of this, the authors develop a new model, based mainly on a political-business
cycle argument, to account for these dynamics. The basic proposition in this model is that
variations in national defense spending arise from political considerations which are related
to real and desired conditions within the national economy. Applying this model to the
experience of the United States 1948-1976, the authors show that it has a large measure of
empirical validity. If one removes the effects of war-time mobilization, it is clear that for
the United States the principal driving forces in military spending dynamics were (1) the
perceived utility of such spending in stabilizing aggregate demand, (2) the political or
electoral value of the perceived economic effects arising out of such spending, and (3) the
pressures of institutional-constituency demands.
1. Introductory remarks
Both because of its bearing on national se-
curity and because it is so large and visible,
defense spending has been the frequent ob-
ject of both political and academic contro-
versy in the US. The issue which has com-
manded particular attention in the foreign
policy literature concerns the causes of the
regular post-war increases in such expend-
iture. It perhaps reflects the misleading
simplicity of the problem that, despite the
elegance of theoretical formulations and the
sophistication of analytic techniques em-
ployed, there is as yet no compelling ex-
planation of the levels of, and rates of
change in, military spending in the United
States. The question of the domestic con-
sequences of defense outlays has also been
occasionally addressed, although frequently
from an excessively doctrinaire perspective
and with results barely more conclusive than
those concerning its determinants.
Our first task in this paper will be to
account for variations in US military spend-
ing during the past three decades. We begin
by providing a brief assessment of the ex-
tant analytical frameworks bearing on this
issue. Following that, we construct an alter-
native, though partly complementary, ex-
planatory structure of our own. Specifically,
we examine the proposition that variations
in defense spending arise from political
consideration which are related to real and
desired conditions within the national
economy. Finally, we ask how successfully
military spending functions as a tool of
macro-economic policy as far as the reduc-
tion of unemployment is concerned.
2. Compulsion or impulsion?
Two principal types of explanation have
been advanced to account for changing mili-
tary expenditures: the first relies primarily
on influences exogenous to the nation, the
second focuses on internal considerations.
Most writers in the first tradition rely, to
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a greater or lesser extent, on the well known
and pioneering work of Lewis Richardsoni 1
who presented the first formal statement of
the dynamics of arms races. In a model com-
bining intuitive plausibility and theoretical
parsimony, he suggested that the driving
force behind fluctuations in military spend-
ing was the continuous and apparently in-
eluctable process of action and reaction be-
tween two rival nations. The model was cast
in the form of linear differential equations
from which equilibrium conditions were
deduced.
Richardson’s thought has dominated the
arms race literature and is unlikely to be
completely abandoned in the near future.
There are, neverthelss, problems with this
perspective. We are, first of all, aware of no
compelling empirical evidence that has been
adduced in support of the ’action-reaction’
hypothesis. Furthermore, the model pays
little attention to the matter of how actual
decisions are made or to the institutional
procedures surrounding them. Thus, we are
told nothing of the actors and interests in-
volved, or of the perceptions and motiva-
tions of the relevant parties.
This latter shortcoming is at least partly
remedied by the second of the two major
perspectives on military expenditures, as it
relies primarily on certain organizational
dynamics within the state. The basic idea is
that the decision to acquire additional mili-
tary resources is imbedded in an organiza-
tional and bureaucratic setting.2 The com-
plexity of the decisionmaking process will
lead to the establishment of routinized prac-
tices, the choice of predictable figures for
budgetary requests (which tend to be a
simple function of past requests), and just as
predictable congressional modifications of
the original figures. Regularity over time is
the outcome; as a result, the best predictor
of new increments to military expenditure
are simply those which obtained in the
immediate past.3 3
Attempts at explicitly evaluating the rela-
tive performance of the two contending
approaches tend, in general, to favor the
second one. Charles Ostrom (1977) recently
conducted a quantitative study of the re-
spective predictive powers of the two models
in the context of US-Soviet defense spend-
ing. On the basis of the results of an econo-
metric analysis, that author found it very
difficult to distinguish empirically the two
types of effects. The bulk of the evidence is,
however, more conclusive. Albert Wohlstet-
ter, on the basis of arguments presented in
two articles (1974a, b), has concluded that:
’The iron law that is supposed to govern stra-
tegic action (for Every Action, there is An
Opposing Equal or Greater-than-Equal
Reaction) is made in fact of plastic’ (1974b,
p. 49). One of the present authors, in a
study that sought to deal with many of the
problems of previous investigations of the
Richardsonian paradigm, found little evi-
dence to lend support to the ’action-reac-
tion’ hypothesis. However, using a fairly
elaborate model of the internal processes of
the state, he found support for the notion
that organizational and fiscal factors play
an important role in generating arms level
changes. (See Cusack, 1978.) A recent study
by Kenneth Organski, Jacek Kugler, and
Daniel Fox (1978), which statistically com-
pared the performance of the two models as
far as US and Soviet procurement of strate-
gic arms is concerned, also found exogenous
considerations less important than those of
a domestic nature.
Thus, it would seem on the basis of ex-
tant research that internal considerations
have clear causal primacy in accounting for
military spending. Yet even here we have
ample reason to be dissatisfied with the
existing propositional framework and
knowledge claims. On purely empirical
grounds, the paradigm suggests a temporal
continuity devoid of abrupt changes -
something clearly inconsistent with the
historical record. The time-series plot of
both absolute levels of defense spending in
the United States during the past several
decades and of annual changes in these
levels (see Fig. 1) supports this charge. The
simple ’autoregressive’ movement suggested
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by the ’organizational’ model implies a
relatively smooth progression of expend-
itures rather than the jagged trajectory
actually displayed. Furthermore, there is
nothing in the model which would explain
the major accelerations of the early 1950s
and late 1960s.4
Fig. 1. US Defense Spending.
The major problem, from our point of
view, is simply that the range of theoretical
considerations addressed has so far been
excessively narrow. Despite the plausibility
of the postulated effects of organizational
and bureaucratic politics, we find it hard to
believe that this is all there is to domestic
influences. The primary need might be for
new avenues of inquiry: and we shall pro-
pose one which relies on the conjunction of
political and economic forces in explaining
US defense spending.
3. An alternative approach
Before we can advance our own, statisti-
cally verifiable propositions, a number of
considerations must be introduced for con-
trol purposes. Contemporary research has,
as noted above, suggested that a useful pre-
dictor of fluctuations in defense spending is
given by the simple autoregressive process
whereby current changes are a function of
those in the immediate past. We therefore
accept as a first hypothesis introduced for
control purposes that:
(1) b(m~)/6(Am~_1) >0, where Amt is the
change in ;the real value of US de-
fense spending between the past and
the current year,5 and 6mt -1 is the
change in the real value of US de-
fense spending between the past year
and the year preceding it.
An additional variable which should be
introduced for purposes of statistical control
is US involvement or non-involvement in an
armed conflict claiming its military re-
sources. While the self-evident nature of
this consideration might account for its ne-
glect in much empirical research, we feel
that it would be rash, from a statistical
point of vie N at least, not to include it in an
explanatory schema. An additional proposi-
tion is therefore the following:
(2) a(Awt/awt>O, where w reflects the ex-
tent of US war involvement in the
year t.
A glance at Fig. 1 suggests that increases
in military expenditures are not of a uniform
level for the entire duration of the wars.
During both the Korean and the Vietnam
wars, initially very high increases were fol-
lowed by very low increments for the rest
of the wars’ durations. On inductive ex-
amination, it appeared that the large in-
creases occur during the first two years of
the war, diminishing thereafter. Thus, a peak
in the size of annual increases is reached
after two years (or was, in any case, for
these two wars); a period which seems to
correspond to the time necessary to mobilize
and deploy forces for limited conventional
warfare. Before and after the peak, how-
ever, changes seem to proceed exponentially
(albeit in different directions). Without the
guidance of any formal theory of the pro-
cess of conventional wartime mobilization,
but with some inductive experimentation,6 6
we conjectured that the process could be
represented by a function of the following
simple exponential form:
(3) Wt = c X 1/2 (tw-tp) where, t~Y is the
current war year (e.g., t, = 3 if this
is the third year since the beginning
of the war),
104
tp is the peak year with (in our case)
a constant value of 2,
c = 1, if t is a war year
= 0, otherwise
Implied, therefore, is a process wherein the
size of annual increments to defense spend-
ing increases exponentially during the first
two years of the war and tapers off asymp-
totically thereafter.
Both Lmt -1 and wt are interesting, in-
deed obvious, predictors of fluctuations in
Amt. We will, however, attempt to probe
deeper by examining the extent to which
domestic political functions might be per-
formed by accelerating or decelerating mili-
tary spending in the United States. Since
final decisions on military spending are
taken by the President and Congress, i. e. by
elected officials, a useful starting point might
be to investigate which (if any) political
gains or costs they might experience as a
result of such fluctuations.
A promising line of inquiry is suggested
by several recent studies which assert that
national economic performance is a major
determinant of electoral outcomes. The spe-
cific relevance of such conclusions for our
purposes resides in the existence of an ad-
ditional body of literature which seeks to
link military spending to economic per-
formance. To guide our efforts we will,
therefore, entertain three questions:
t 1 ) Does economic performance influence elec-
toral outcomes for incumbent political author-
ities ?
(2) If so, do incumbents attempt to manipulate
the economy for their electoral ends?
(3) Do military expenditures affect economic
performance?
If there were reason for an affirmative
answer to each of these questions, then we
could additionally inquire:
(4) Is there reason to believe that military spend-
ing might, at least partially, be used by in-
cumbents for political-electoral purposes?
Let us begin with the first question. A
number of studies indicate that electoral out-
comes are responsive to objective economic
conditions. Gerald Kramer (1971), in an
innovative study, sought to relate variations
in real and money income, unemployment,
and rate of inflation to the outcome of
congressional elections. His conclusion,
based on a sound statistical analysis, was
that economic fluctuations do in fact rep-
resent ’important influences on congres-
sional elections, with economic upturn help-
ing the congressional candidates of the
incumbent party, and economic decline
benefiting the opposition’ (ibid, p. 40). The
most significant impact, according to Kra-
mer, is produced by changes in per-capita
income (with a 10 % increase in real per-
sonal income inducing a 4-5 % gain in the
incumbent parties’ congressional vote). In a
more recent study of mid-term congressional
elections, Edward Tufte (1975) concluded
that, controlling for presidential popularity,
a change in disposable per-capita income of
$180 (in constant terms) would be expected
to yield a 6 % change in the number of
votes obtained by the incumbent party in
mid-term elections. In subsequent research,
Tufte generalized these results to the on-
year congressional vote as well as to presi-
dential election. In sum, it would appear
that, at least in the US context, economic
performance has an important influence on
electoral outcomes for incumbent politicians.
The answer to our first question is therefore
affirmative.
What about the manipulation of the
economy for political profit? The finding
that economic conditions affect the electoral
performance of those in power quite natur-
ally suggests the possibility that incumbents,
in a post-Keynesian era, might actually
manipulate economic conditions so as to
increase their chances of continued incum-
bency. Some research by William Nordhaus
and Tufte indicates that such is indeed the
case. The latter, in the most popular piece
of work on the subject, investigated the
possibility that ’incumbents may seek to
determine the location and timing of eco-
nomic benefits in promoting the fortunes of
their party and friends’8. His findings indi-
cate the existence within the United States
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of a ’political business cycle’ conceived of as
a successful attempt to make the timing of im-
provements in national macroeconomic per-
formance correspond to the electoral cycle.
For example, postwar increases in real dis-
posable income were shown to coincide
with election years (particularly on-year
elections with an incumbent president seek-
ing a second term). Furthermore, unemploy-
ment rates were found to decline in the
two years preceding a presidential election
(Tufte, 1978, pp. 3-28).
There is therefore reason to believe that
elected officials in the United States perceive
the relevance of economic fluctuations to
their political fortunes and, as a conse-
quence, attempt to act on them with the
specific aim of affecting the timing of the
business cycle. The second of our four
questions seems also to merit an affirmative
answer. Furthermore, if military spending
has, as some claim, a significant economic
impact in the US, then these expenditures
might also be partly accounted for by such
domestic political considerations. The next
question to address then concerns the im-
pact of defense spending on economic per-
formance.
What can we say about the effects of
military outlays on national economic con-
ditions ? The basic proposition underlying
much of the written work on this issue is the
simple Keynesian statement that recessions
occur when aggregate demand within the
economy falls short of productive capacity.
The consequence of this is inventory ac-
cumulation, unemployment, and sluggish or
negative growth. As private consumption
and especially investment are usually in-
sufficient to maintain an adequate level of
aggregate demand, there is a need to in-
crease this demand through governmental
expenditures for goods and services. In a
’mixed economy’, military expenditures are
considered by some to be rather well suited
for such purposes. In the contemporary
United States, according to Hitch and Mc-
Kean (1961, p. 69):
Defense spending, which often amounts to 10
percent of GNP nowadays, is a significant com-
ponent of government and total spending. Where
government spends such an amount for national
security (or for anything else) it tends to buoy up
total spending. The existence of this demand makes
a deficiency of total demand less probable. More-
over, it facilitates the application of other anti-
deflationary measures, like the injection of addi-
tional money into the economy.
Somewhat further to the left, John Ken-
neth Galbraith (1967, p. 235) points out:
If a large sector of the economy supported by
personal and corporate income taxation is the
fulcrum for the regulation of demand, plainly
military expenditures are the pivot on which the
fulcrum rests.
While radical economists use the concept
of ’absorptive capacity’ rather than aggregate
demand, their conclusion concerning the
economic role of defense spending is simi-
lar. James Cypher (1977, p. 1; see also
Smith, 1977), for example, maintains that
for the US economy:
The fluctuation in GNP can be accounted for,
to a considerable degree, by fluctuation in military
expenditure. Postwar stabilization has (for the
most part) been achieved by manipulating military
expenditures.
It is of course one thing to quote other
authors and another to present one’s own
quantitative proof. While a complete test of
the relation between US economic growth
and military outlays is beyond the scope of
this paper, we can report on a simple test of
their statistical association. The most prev-
alent measure of national economic per-
formance is, without doubt, the growth in
GNP per capita. Furthermore, most people
seem to think of and refer to fluctuations in
GNP per capita in percentage terms, and of
fluctuations in military expenditures in abso-
lute terms (e. g., an increase of $5 billion). If
changes in percent growth of GNP per capita
seemed to be empirically associated with
changes in levels of military spending, a
causal connection might well be established
both in the public’s and the politicians’ eyes.
It would also suggest, pending a more thor-
ough macroeconomic examination,9 that
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they may well be right. We formulated a
simple econometric model of the form:
(4) In (Et) == k + 8nit + ut, where, mt
represents the level (in real terms) of
US military spending in year t, and
Et represents the real value of GNP
per capita in year t.1.0
In a bivariate relation, where the de-
pendent variable is represented by its natural
logarithm and the independent variable by
its absolute value, it can be demonstrated
that the regression coefficient (multiplied
by 100) may be interpreted as approximat-
ing the percentage change in the former as-
sociated with a unit change in the latter.
In other words, 8 may be interpreted as
(6E/Et) / 6mt.ll In the present formulation
Am~ is of the magnitude of one million dol-
lars measured in real terms.
A preliminary estimation using ordinary
least squares yielded considerable first-
order autocorrelation (dew _ 0.62). We
therefore reestimated the model using the
Cochran-Orcutt iterative procedure. The re-
sults are displayed in Table I. While the
overall fit is quite good for a simple
bivariate model, the estimated coefficient
of .004 suggests that a 1 % annual in-
crease in GNP per capita in the United
States is associated with a $2.5 billion in-
crease in military spending. The statistical
significance of the coefficient (which is more
than three times larger than its standard
error) is also encouraging. While the ex-
treme simplicity of the model allows us to
claim no more, we do believe that this
association might generally be perceived as
reflecting a causal link in the eyes of the
relevant actors.
While we will return to the relation be-
tween macroeconomic performance and
military spending later in this study, we
now have some reason to believe the follow-
ing three statements (which correspond to
our first three questions): (a) objective eco-
nomic conditions affect the incumbent
party’s electoral prospects; (b) incumbents
seem to manipulate these conditions so as
to make periods of economic expansion
precede important election years; and (c)
economic growth has, between 1948 and
1976, been positively associated with in-
creases in defense spending. The question of
whether variations in military spending are
linked to electoral-economic considerations
now seems to follow naturally. Rational
political incumbents, realizing that economic
conditions affect their fate, will seek to
manipulate the economy to their benefit.
Since military spending, which is clearly
under their control, appears to promote eco-
nomic conditions beneficial to their political
fortunes, should we not expect the incum-
bents to use this fiscal tool to their advan-
tage ?
Despite what we have said so far, the sug-
gestion that defense spending, an instrument
of national security, is manipulated for
domestic political purposes might seem
rather far-fetched to some. There is, how-
ever, some anecdotal evidence which points
to its credibility. For example, in Six Crises
(1962, p. 309), Richard Nixon recalls that
in March 1960, during the electoral cam-
paign, Arthur Burns visited him and:
expressed great concern about the way the econ-
omy was then acting... Burns’ conclusion was
that unless some decisive governmental action
were taken, and taken soon, we were heading for
another dip, which would hit its low point in
October, just before the elections. He urged
strongly that everything be done to avert this
development. He urgently recommended that two
steps be taken immediately: by loosening up cre-
dit and, where justifiable, by increasing spending
for national security. The next time I saw the
President, I discussed Burns’ proposals with him
and he in turn put the subject on the agenda for
the next Cabinet meeting. [our italics]
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Although endorsed by Nixon, Burn’s sug-
gestion eventually did not prevail - ap-
parently because the economic situation was
not deemed perilous enough. Yet the poten-
tial utility of such methods was clearly per-
ceived - even in an administration noted
for its conservative approach to fiscal and
macroeconomic questions.
If our line of seasoning is substantially
correct, one would expect to see particularly
high growth in levels of defense spending in
the years preceding on-year elections. This
would be due to a vigorous attempt by the
incumbents at promoting economic expan-
sion, and thus an increase in income and
employment levels, at a time when this seems
politically most beneficial. In the years fol-
lowing the election, we would expect decel-
erating rates of military growth as the elec-
toral incentive is temporarily removed (and
as considerations of inflation take prece-
dence). During the four-year period between
two on-year elections we would therefore
expect that changes in defense spending
would, ceteris paribus, manifest a cyclical
pattern marked by early deceleration and
later acceleration. This follows from two
assumptions. First, military expenditures are
a useful way of acting on aggregate demand
and hence of pursuing stabilization policies.l2
Secondly, politicians, who are dealing with an
economy constrained by a tradeoff (or the
appearance of such) between unemployment
and inflation, and facing an electorate for
whom growth and employment in the most
recent period is paramount, will distribute
the terms of the tradeoff in such a way as to
derive the greatest political benefit. Ap-
proaching on-year elections will lead to
expansionary policies; but, following an
election, the need to promote growth and
full employment will be replaced by a need
to curb inflation generated by the previous
expansionary decisions. 13 This retrenchment
cannot be implemented overnight, yet the
shift should be noticeable. Formally then:
(5) &eth;(.6.mt) l&eth;(Vt) > 0, where, Vt = 1 if t
precedes or coincides with an on-year
election.
= --1 if t succeeds by one or two
years the election.
Of course, not all macroeconomic policy
is geared to electoral goals. Stabilization is
an objective pursued in its own right and,
to the extent that military spending serves
the specific function of compensating for
inadequacies in aggregate demand, we
would also expect to observe a negative
relation across time between fluctuations in
such spending and private consumption and
investment expenditures. Formally:
(6) ~(amt)/aQ{c-~--i)t < 0, where, c, i rep-
resent private consumption and in-
vestment spending.14
To recapitulate, we predicted that the
change in military spending which had oc-
curred during the previous year would be
an important determinant of the change
occurring in the present year; the process of
wartime mobilization would generate
changes of an exponential form; the time
separating t from the nearest on-year elec-
tion would affect spending such that de-
celeration would occur toward the beginning
of the cycle and acceleration would occur
toward the end of the four-year period;
finally, changes in aggregate private demand
would call forth an opposite change in mili-
tary spending. Bringing together inequalities
1, 2, 5 and 6, we obtain the following pre-
dictive model for changes in US military
expenditures:
(7) .6.mt = k + Ôl (.6.mt-l) + Ô2Wt +
6:ivt + 64 .6.(c+i)t + Ut, where, k
is a constant term reflecting the ’long
run’ tendency of US military spend-
ing to increase independently of any
of the other variable considerations,
ut is a stochastic term, and, the other
terms are as defined above.
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The temporal progression of wt, as well as Vt
and Q(c+i), is displayed in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Predictors of changes in defense spending.
4. Statistical results
The results of a statistical estimation of the
model and its parameters are presented in
Table II. The general and encouraging con-
clusion is that our predictions have met with
a good deal of success. Thus, the coefficients
for both the ’organizational’ and war vari-
ables take on positive signs and are several
times larger than their standard errors as re-
flected in the magnitude of their t values.
The coefficient for the lagged value of
changes in military spending suggests that
the scope of incrementalism is rather nar-
row. The coefficient for war mobilization
indicates the following expected sequence in
spending increases from the outset of the
conventional war: 10.5 billion (in real,
1972, dollars), 21.0, 10.5, 5.3, 2.6, ...,
through the end of the war. No decrease in
expenditures in the years succeeding the war
is expected. This last point, of course, con-
cords with the suggestions of a ’ratchet
effect’ in the military effort of states in-
volved in a war (see Russett, 1970). War
increases the military effort; and, while this
increase tapers off progressively, the level
of post-war spending will be significantly
greater than that in the pre-war period
(ceteris paribus).
More relevant to our immediate concerns
are the other results. The electoral coef-
ficient’s sign is in the predicted direction and
its magnitude is nearly twice that of its
standard error. Thus, military spending cer-
tainly seems to fluctuate in accordance with
the swing of the electoral cycle. Military
spending is cut back at an expected rate of
$2 billion per-annum after on-year elections
and expanded at a similar rate in the two
years prior to those elections - again, other
things being equal.
The sign of the coefficient for fluctua-
tions in aggregate private demand is in the
predicted direction, indicating an expected
$60 million dollar increase in defense
spending resulting from a $1 billion dollar
decline in private consumption and in-
vestment. A corresponding increase in pri-
vate demand would call forth an expected
decrease in military spending under ceteris
paribus conditions. The estimated coefficient
is, however, quite unstable: in fact, a 90 %
confidence interval would place it some-
where between 0.015 and --0.I4 (although
it is centered on -0.061).
Since we are dealing with time series data,
we should be concerned with the problem
of autocorrelation among the residuals -
which might vitiate some of our statistical
findings. As we have a lagged endogenous
variable in our set of predictor variables, a
Durbin-Watson statistic is not an appro-
priate measure of serial correlation and so
we relied on the Durbin’s h statistic instead
(see Johnston, 1972, pp. 309-313). The
value of this statistic (0.84) indicates that
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first order autocorrelation is unlikely to be
a problem. A visual examination of higher
order autocorrelation coefficients suggested
no other autoregressive or moving average
process among the errors.
In sum, we believe that our model of
changes in US defense spending does a good
job. We are able to account for over 70 %
of the variance, and most of our variables
perform very well. In addition, the set of
findings for total military spending (net of
transfers and interest payments) holds
generally across the major categories of this
spending effort. In Table III and Table IV,
we present the results from analyses of the
two principal components of defense spend-
ing : spending for capital goods items (pur-
chases of equipment and facilities) and labor
items (compensation of military and civilian
employees).15
The model is able to account for 52 % of
the variance in capital goods purchases and
72 % of the variance in direct personnel
expenditures. More interesting are the coef-
ficient estimates.
* Model estimated using Cochran-Orcutt technique
** me represents purchases for equipment and
facilities
The lagged dependent variable’s coef-
ficient in the equation for capital expend-
itures is not highly significant, though in the
predicted direction. In the second equation,
this same variable performs considerably
better. The obvious conclusion is that spend-
ing on compensation of personnel is not
very volatile across time (indeed it seems to
follow a predictable and steady upward pro-
* Model estimated using Cochran-C?rcutt tech-
nique.
** mP represents purchases of services of military
and defense civilian personnel.
gression). The war-mobilization variable
does a good job in both equations. Private
aggregate demand does considerably better
in the first model. The coefficient for the
electoral variable performs very well again,
although it is somewhat higher for capital
spending than for labor compensation. This
too is an anticipated result, as the former is
more easily manipulable than the latter.
(In fact, the reverse result for the ’organiza-
tional’ variable is a natural corollary to this
finding.)
Our model therefore predicts not only to
aggregate defense purchases of goods and
services, but, with some slight differences,
to purchases for each category separately.
After taking up the question of the impact
of defense spending for employment within
the US economy, we shall return to a fur-
ther discussion of the meaning of our find-
ings.
5. The domestic impact of defense spend-
ing : the case of unemployment
It might be useful at this stage to assess
how beneficial military spending actually is
in terms of its domestic impact. We have
presented some rudimentary evidence sug-
gesting that defense expenditures are as-
sociated with growth in national income. Our
measure of national income was GNP per
capita (expressed in real terms), i. e. the
total dollar value of goods produced and
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services rendered within the US economy
divided by the size of the nation’s popula-
tion.
GNP per capita is of course a simple and
widely reported statistic and as such is one
to which voters can easily relate and re-
spond. Its impact, furthermore, seems to lie
in its fluctuations rather than its levels (a
reflection, according to James Tobin, of the
fact that ’a first derivative mentality is strong
in American politics’ (1974, p. 20).
A number of caveats should be provided
with respect to this measure of national eco-
nomic performance. It provides, first of all,
no information concerning income distribu-
tion and says little about the structural
underpinnings of the economy. Furthermore,
it tells us nothing about the externalities and
opportunity costs associated with the ex-
pansion of economic activity.16 However,
one thing usually associated with rapid
growth in national income is a correspond-
ing increase in levels of employment.17 This
is in fact one of the beneficial domestic
effects most frequently attributed to military
spending by its major proponents.18
Estimates vary as to the number of
people whose employment is somehow
related to the military effort. This dissensus
generally follows from disagreements re-
garding the multiplier effects attendant to
military spending. One estimate of the full
effect of defense spending on US unemploy-
ment is reported by Best and Connolly (1976,
pp. 55-56). By their estimates, in CY 1970,
with 2.9 million people in the armed forces,
1.2 million civilian employees in the Depart-
ment of Defense, and 3 million employees
in defense industries (principal contractors),
a total of 7.1 million people were directly
employed through the US defense effort.
Added to this, they contend, would be the
efforts of the defense multiplier. They argue
that for each job created directly by defense
spending (in both the public and private
sectors), another job will be created in pri-
vate industry (job multiplier equals one).
Thus, by their estimates, the total level of
employment attributable to defense spend-
ing was over 14 million. Thus, if one adds
the 7.9 million unemployed in CY 1970 to
the approximately 14 million of Best and
Connolly, the total level of unemployment
would be some 22 million, or 26 % of the
labor force (an unemployment level slightly
greater than any experienced at the nadir of
the Great Depression). The year 1970, how-
ever, was an exceptional year since Viet-
nam involvement was at its height; a job
multiplier of one might also be somewhat
inflated. According to the Department of
Defense the job multiplier effects may be
equal to the more conservative figure of 0.5
in the year of expenditure (1978, p. 102). By
this estimate, the employment level attribut-
able to military spending in CY 1970 would
equal approximately 10.8 million, and not
14.2 million.
We have estimated the level of employ-
ment generated by the military effort for a
number of years under different multiplier
assumptions. In Table V, row (a) represents
the total number of people (in thousands)
whose employment is directly accounted for
by defense spending, i. e. military personnel,
DoD civilian employees, and people em-
ployed in defense industries; row (b) pro-
vides the sum of the previous figure and a
’conservative’ multiplier effect of 0.5; row
(c) repeats this for a ’radical’ multiplier of
unity; row (d) gives the total number of un-
employed in the relevant year; rows (e) and
(f), respectively, provide the total number
of people who would have been unemployed
had it not been for defense spending under
both multiplier assumptions.
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According to these figures, military related
employment levels have been quite high in
the post-war period. Even including 1940,
the four year average produces a figure of
just over 7 million for the 0.5 multiplier, and
over 9.3 million for the 1.0 multiplier. These
are substantial figures and would be even
more so were we to focus exclusively on the
post-war period. The truly relevant question,
however, should in our opinion be the fol-
lowing : does military spending make a sig-
nificantly different contribution to the re-
duction of unemployment than would other,
more socially useful, types of expenditure?
What effect, for example, would the same
dollar produce were it allocated to some
other form of federal spending (e. g., educa-
tion), or had it, say, been channeled down
to state and local governments?
Two recent studies, one conducted by the
Public Interest Research Group in Michigan
(PIRGIM), the other by the Center for
Defense Information, have recently ad-
dressed this question. Both conclude that
military spending is not an efficient way of
generating employment. The PIRGIM
(1978) report undertook a comparison of
the number of jobs created by public ex-
penditure for various purposes. The results
are presented in Table VI: the obvious con-
clusion is that defense spending fares rather
poorly as a vehicle for job creation.
The unimpressive performance of the
military dollar is, in all likelihood, due to
the fact that the sum of compensation,
equipment and associated costs is higher in
the military sphere than in most others. The
(1977) study conducted by the Center for
Defense Information gives a comparable
picture of the performance of defense spend-
ing in the reduction of unemployment, as it
appears that several obvious alternative
types of spending would generate more jobs
than does defense (see Table VII).
The discrepancy between the two figures
for defense related employment is due to the
fact that they were computed for different
years (the CDS computations are based on
1978 estimates, while those of PIRGIM
predate this by several years). Neither study
seems to take job multiplier effects into con-
sideration. This, however, would not alter
the conclusions very drastically. Even if we
were to make the extreme assumption that
the military multiplier were equal to one,
and that no multiplier effect existed for
other categories of spending, defense would
rank only second in either Table. Under
more plausible assumptions it would do
even less well.
6. Conclusions
The appropriate conclusion seems to be that
while defense spending can perform a dis-
cernible economic function, this could be
somewhat better accomplished by non-mili-
tary forms of spending, at least as far as
employment is concerned. The question is
then obvious: why should any reliance be
placed on military spending in this context?
A first answer is that exclusive reliance is
certainly not placed on this sort of expend-
iture ; numerous other ways of stabilizing the
economy (e. g., by manipulating the money
supply) are available and are used. Never-
theless, defense outlays do seem to have a
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number of advantages in this regard, of
which we shall list three in particular
(1) Independently of its effects in the post-
war period, massive government spending
generally has not been welcomed by the US
public. Defense spending, however, can be
rather easily justified to the tax-paying
electorate as national security needs can
most often be plausibly invoked.
(2) Military spending is highly expandable
as it does not, like many other forms of
government spending, compete directly with
private investment. Its supplements but does
not supplant the private sector .21 Thus, its
expansion will not undermine business con-
fidence - an outcome which would only cut
short any upswing.
(3) Many military goods have the advantage
of possessing a rather short life-span and
must be frequently replaced to avert ob-
solescence. As most of the machinary is
specific to a given type of armament, it must
be replaced almost as frequently as the final
product. The scope for capital purchases is
thus quite large.
Furthermore, despite the considerable lag
between the time when the development of a
new weapon (or other system) is initiated
and its actual production, employment and
other effects appear from the moment ob-
ligations are first incurred. From that mo-
ment, orders are placed, subcontracting
agreements can be signed, hiring gets under-
way, and so forth.22 Thus, results are pro-
duced quite rapidly. Also, politicans can in
many instances control these effects rather
well. While the influence of elected of-
ficials is obviously greatest at the stage of
appropriations, they can also influence the
timing of actual obligations and even spend-
ing - e.g., via the Chief Executive’s control
of the O.M.B.
These are all compelling advantages for
an incumbent despite the restricted value of
this tool of macroeconomic policy. They
seem to demonstrate that policy is neither
the art of the optimal nor of the possible,
but primarily the practice of the expedient.
It is thus possible to explain the dual
domestic function of military spending as a
means of: (a) stimulating the economy in
anticipation of electoral benefits, and (b)
compensating for shortfalls in private con-
sumption and investment. The level of our
knowledge is, however, still rough and much
scope exists for further study. The ’guns vs.
butter’ trade-off has not been sufficiently
studied. It would also be very interesting to
delve more deeply into the various means by
which the volume, location, and timing of
spending can actually be influenced by in-
cumbents (for example, by the use of ’sup-
plementary appropriations’). Also, while the
’action-reaction’ hypothesis does not seem
particularly useful, other models of a less
regular form of response to Soviet spending
should be examined.
NOTES
1. See his Arms and Insecurity (1960). A good
discussion of this and other works by Richardson
is to be found in Rapoport’s review article (1957).
See also Caspary (1967) and Zinnes and Gillespie
(1976, part III). Of related interest is Hunting-
ton’s (1958) article.
2. Much of the relevant writing is based on the
work of Wildavsky and his associates, the best
summary being his 1975 volume; as well as on the
work of Graham Allison (1971, 1975). An appli-
cation of this perspective to the issue of military
expenditure is to be found in John P. Crecine and
Gregory W. Fisher’s paper on the US Defense De-
partment (1973).
3. As Allison summarizes the approach: ’Major
lines of organizational action are straight, i. e.,
behavior at one time is marginally different from
that behavior at t-1. Simple-minded predictions
work best: Behavior at t+1 will be marginally dif-
ferent from behavior at the previous time’ (1975,
p.58).
4. Data on military spending in this article will
be defined as total purchases of military related
goods and services. For 1948-1974: 1975 Statistical
Supplement to the Survey of Current Business; for
1975&mdash;1976, Survey of Current Business (July
1977).
5. 1972 will be the base year for the calculation
of constant prices.
6. We believe that the basically a-theoretical
nature of this measure is justified by our interest
in including wartime mobilization exclusively for
purposes of statistical control. We do not attempt
to explain its progression.
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7. See Tufte (1975). For on-year congressional
elections and presidential elections, see his more
recent work, The Political Control of the Economy,
Chap. 5. See also Ray C. Fair’s 1978 article ’The
Effect of Economic Events on Votes for the
President’, George Stigler’s 1973 paper ’General
Economic Conditions and National Elections’, and
Susan Leppe’s 1974 paper ’Voting Behavior and
Aggregate Policy Targets’.
8. See Tufte ( 1978, p.4), and William D. Nord-
haus, ’The Political Business Cycle’. Related
studies are: Duncan MacRae’s ’A Political Model
of the Business Cycle’, James R. Crotty’s ’Specifi-
cation Error in Macro-Econometric Models: The
Influence of Policy Goals’, Douglas A. Hibbs Jr.’s
’Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’, and
Bruno Frey’s Modern Political Economy (esp.
Parts III and IV).
9. The provision of such an analysis may well
mark the point where the responsibility of the
political scientist stops and that of the profes-
sional economist begins.
10. Data on GNP per capita from Economic
Report of the President, 1976. Note that the dol-
lar values employed in all of our statistical an-
alyses are expressed in constant prices with the
base year being 1972.
11. The reader may verify this by performing
the relevant differentiation.
12. By manipulating military spending, a govern-
ment is acting on aggregate demand. While this is
a major part of regulatory macroeconomic policy,
it might be less appropriate for small and open
economies (such as those of Western Europe)
than it is for the US economy. Assar Lindbeck
(1976), for example, suggests that instead of acting
on aggregate demand, the following alternatives
are available: (1) policies designed to influence
relative prices, (2) market-improving and mobil-
ity-increasing policies, (3) managing supply, and,
(4) ’selective demand management’. For this
reason, military spending should not be expected
to play a similar role in most other industrialized
democracies as it does in the US.
13. To quote Lindbeck ( 1976, p. 13) again, ’the
government will usually cut back aggregate de-
mand after the election in order to bring down the
rate of inflation, to squeeze out inflationary ex-
pectations and hence to shift down the short-term
Phillips curve, as well as to reduce deficits in the
current account, well in time before the next
election, so that new expansionary actions can
again be undertaken before that election.’ See
also Nordhaus (1975).
14. Data on private consumption and invest-
ment are taken from Economic Report of the
President, 1977.
15. Data for capital items and personnel com-
pensation are from various issues of Defense
Indicators.
16. A measure more reflective of these has been
proposed by Tobin and Nordhaus in, ’Is Growth
Obsolete?’ (1972).
17. According to the well-known ’Okun’s Law’
a 3 % growth in GNP in the United States is
needed to reduce unemployment by 1 %. See
Arthur Okun (1970), p. 240.
18. The reader will recall that this was one of
the main arguments advanced against abandoning
B-1 bomber production by its supporters.
19. Data are from the March issues of Monthly
Labor Review, for the relevant years.
20. These reasons are most often advanced by
radical economists. See, for instance, Murray Wei-
denbaum, ’Defense Expenditures and the Domestic
Economy’, in Mansfield (ed.) (1968); Michael
Reich (1972), pp. 296-303, and Cypher (1974).
21. This point had been initially advanced by
Michael Kalecki in his 1943 article, ’Political
Aspects of Full Employment’.
22. The same effect may, to a certain extent,
be achieved through simple obligation as by actual
expenditures (Greenberg 1967, Lee 1970), a mat-
ter to which governments appear oblivious.
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